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Committee Report on Jurisdiction,
Definition of Crimes, and Complementarity
LEILA SADAT WEXLER*
1. In November 1996, members of the International Law Associa-
tion Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)
met in conjunction with other members of the human rights commu-
nity and experts on the proposed ICC over a two day period. Both a
feasibility study on the Organization of the International Criminal
Court: Administrative and Financial Issues, prepared by Thomas War-
rick, and the six reports submitted to the Committee by Christopher
Blakesley, Jeffrey Bleich, Jordan Paust, Michael Scharf, and Edward
Wise contained in this volume were discussed. In addition, M. Cherif
Bassiouni summarized the discussions held at the second session of
the Preparatory Committee. Subsequently, a report was prepared by
the Chair, circulated to the membership of the entire Committee and
revised accordingly. The Committee's recommendations and conclusions
are set out below.1
2. As a preliminary matter, the Committee unanimously endorses
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, and
hopes that the Court could be operational in the near future. Such a
Court could function both as a forum for the trial of war criminals as
well as an institution capable of constructing a framework for the es-
tablishment of justice and the international rule of law.
3. The Committee greatly appreciates the serious work accom-
plished by the Preparatory Committee to date, and urges the Prepara-
tory Committee to adhere to the resolution adopted by the Sixth Com-
mittee on November 29, 1996, by which it is proposed that the
Committee complete its work by April of 1998.2 The Committee hopes
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis; Chair and Gen-
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a Permanent International Criminal Court.
1. The Committee's work program tracked the work of the Preparatory Committee
in 1996. Special Rapporteurs prepared reports on the issues of general principles of
criminal law, jurisdiction, definition of crimes, triggering mechanisms, complementarity,
cooperation of the Court with national legal systems, and a critique of the Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal. These reports have been submitted and discussed by the Commit-
tee, and are annexed to this report. The Committee will address the issues of the Court's
relationship with the United Nations, organization and budget, establishment, and re-
maining procedural issues in its subsequent work. See infra text para. 38.
2. On December 17, 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
resolution on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court which approved the
dates for the preparatory meetings in 1997 and 1998 as well as to hold the Diplomatic
Conference in 1998.
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that the Preparatory Committee will be able to adopt a work plan that
will permit it to arrive at a completed proposed text by this time.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
4. War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Genocide: The
Court should, of course, have jurisdiction over each of these "core
crimes." The question remains as to their definition, as discussed
below.
5. Treaty Crimes: The Committee supports the inclusion within the
Court's initial jurisdiction of at least some treaty crimes,3 which might
include the unlawful seizure of aircraft (the 1970 Hague Convention),
aircraft sabotage (crimes defined in article 1 of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention), crimes against internationally protected persons (1973 Con-
vention), hostage-taking and related crimes (defined in the 1979 Con-
vention), the torture convention, and crimes against UN personnel.4
6. With respect to drug trafficking, the Committee was split. Some
members thought that it should be included. Although some States
have argued that the prosecutor of the international criminal court
would interfere rather than complement and support national investi-
gations, those members of the Committee supporting the inclusion of
this crime found this argument unpersuasive, given that the Court
would consider only drug offenses of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole, in cases in which a State had determined to cede
jurisdiction it might otherwise exercise to the Court. Moreover, they
did not consider defining this crime to be particularly problematic.
Other members of the Committee disagreed, contending that inclusion
3. As one member noted, however, the term Treaty Crimes' is potentially mislead-
ing because the prohibition of certain war crimes, genocide, and those crimes which the
Committee believes the Court's jurisdiction should be inherent, are also found in
treaties.
4. In addition to the crimes listed in the text, the ILC proposed the inclusion of the
apartheid convention, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, and
Maritime crimes. Some members of the Committee expressed support for the inclusion of
the apartheid convention. A majority of the Committee's members, however, objected to
its inclusion, noting that if South Africa had, itself, decided to employ the procedure of a
"Truth Commission" rather than criminal prosecutions to deal with the crimes of
apartheid, inclusion of the crime within the ICC's jurisdiction would seem to be
inappropriate.
Grave breaches and the crimes enumerated in Protocol I raise a different problem.
The Committee believes that these crimes should be within the Court's jurisdiction, but
not as a result of their status as treaty crimes. Instead, they should fall within the
Court's inherent jurisdiction. Indeed, as one member noted, the ILC's "treaty crime" list
does not sufficiently distinguish between different types of offenses committed against
treaties. A basic distinction may be drawn between crimes committed under color of offi-
cial authority and those crimes which do not necessarily involve official actors. At least
one member of the Committee expressed the view that if the list of treaty offenses over
which the Court will have jurisdiction is to be restricted, priority should be given to
those offenses, like torture, that involve official actors.
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of this crime within the Court's jurisdiction would be too problematic
given the strong opposition of certain States.
7. It is true that political objections, voiced by some States, to the
inclusion of treaty crimes have posed a potential obstacle to the Stat-
ute's ultimate adoption by those States. However, because the Court's
jurisdiction over treaty crimes will, presumably, be predicated on the
consent of the State (or States) involved, such objections do not appear
persuasive. Moreover, many smaller States would like treaty crimes
included, and would be more favorably disposed to ratify the Treaty
establishing the Court if they are included. In addition, the inclusion
of treaty crimes may permit the Court to assume a unifying role in in-
terpreting international criminal law. Finally, the bombing of Pan Am
103 and the resulting international stalemate among several members
of the United Nations over prosecution of the alleged perpetrators,
presents precisely the kind of case that befits prosecution by an inter-
national criminal court. The Court may thus provide a neutral forum
that would not otherwise be available to address a politically-charged
incident.
8. The objection has been made that the inclusion of certain treaty
crimes may trivialize the Court and diminish its moral strength by
having individuals on trial for relatively minor offenses at the same
time that major war criminals are being prosecuted. One method that
might avoid this problem would be to establish a special chamber of
the Court for certain treaty crimes. It was also pointed out that a
means must be found to filter cases to avoid States' dumping insignifi-
cant cases on the Court (such as is now contained to a limited degree
in Article 35 on admissibility and the Preamble).
9. Finally, although practical objections to the inclusion of certain
treaty crimes are not insubstantial (the need for intelligence sharing,5
a secure building, and additional security to protect the Court) neither
are they insurmountable. Reference may be made to the detailed feasi-
bility study of Thomas Warrick, in this regard.
10. Aggression: The Committee is split on the question of aggres-
sion. A majority of the Committee's membership believes that aggres-
sion should be within the Court's jurisdiction. Although aggression
may be difficult to include because there is no clear detailed legal defi-
nition, defining it does not seem an insurmountable task. A failure to
include it would, in the opinion of many, mark a retreat from the prin-
ciples laid down by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
which considered aggression to be the "supreme" international crime.
5. One member suggested that in cases involving treaty crimes, that might other-
wise not be brought before the Court because of a State's reluctance to share intelligence
information, a mechanism could be established whereby the State in question would pro-
vide a substitute prosecutor and thereby control the dissemination of the privileged in-
formation. A majority of the Committee's membership were opposed to this suggestion,
arguing that the Prosecutor must, at all times, remain independent of State control.
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Moreover, the possibility that the Court's establishment could deter
criminal behavior would be seriously weakened were aggression omit-
ted, those who started a conflict might be insulated from punishment.
It is certainly conceivable that, at least in democratic States, a general
or Chief of Staff may, in a particular case, feel that a certain military
action violates international law and raise objections before rather
than after the fact.
11. Some seconded the International Law Commission's (ILC) view
that the Security Council should make an initial determination of ag-
gression in order for the Court's jurisdiction to attach.6 This would pre-
sumably overcome States' political objections to the inclusion of this
crime, at least for States that were members of the Security Council.
12. Other members of the Committee do not believe that aggres-
sion should be included. They argue that its inclusion, particularly as
proposed, will undermine the Court's integrity by subjecting it to the
will of the Security Council. In addition, prosecutions for aggression
may smack of victor's justice and impair the Court's credibility. As one
member of the Committee pointed out, there is no "rule of law" if a
general rule does not apply to everyone. Moreover, in most cases in
which aggression occurs, it is not the aggression that needs to be pun-
ished but the crimes committed against life and property that accom-
pany it - there will always be war crimes and crimes against human-
ity where there is aggression. It was noted that at Nuremberg,
aggression was thought to be the "supreme" crime because it was a
world of States' power in which crimes against humanity were periph-
eral, a situation that is now fundamentally different. Finally, one
member noted in detail that, given the relatively unsuccessful history
of efforts to define aggression to date, defining it may well be an insur-
mountable task.
II. DEFINITION OF CRIMEs AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
13. The Committee strongly urges the Preparatory Committee to
define the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction in the Court's Statute.
While the Rapporteur for this issue agreed that this was not legally re-
quired by international law,7 it is, nonetheless, desirable. As the Rap-
porteur noted in his report to the Committee, a central reason for in-
sisting that punishment be imposed only by virtue of a law enacted
prior to the offense is the sense that fairness requires giving due no-
6. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Ses-
sion, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, May 2-July 22 1994, at 51, UN.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft
Statute].
7. For a thorough analysis of this issue, see Jordan J. Paust, Nullem Crimen and
Related Crimes, 25 DENV. J. IN'L L. & POLY 321 (1997) (demonstrating that enactments
and legislators are not required to create international crimes and that several States
have incorporated international crimes by reference or with general definitions).
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tice of what constitutes prohibited conduct and of what will happen if
the line between permissible and prohibited conduct is crossed.8 In ad-
dition, the principle of legality also rests
in part on the judgment that it is for legislators (or their interna-
tional equivalent) rather than judges to settle questions about what
kinds of conduct will be proscribed . . . that fixed rules are re-
quired if we are to realize the ideal of treating like cases alike, and
. . . that, especially in criminal cases, it is important to apply im-
personal rules articulated beforehand without regard to the partic-
ular persons to whom they will be applied.9
14. The question then arises as to how detailed the definitions
ought to be. While the Rapporteur noted that it would be impractical
to draft an entire criminal code that would be incorporated into the
Court's Statute, offense definitions and certain general principles of
criminal law should be set out in the Statute. Several countries, in
particular Canada, France, and Japan, have proposed texts to be incor-
porated into the Court's Statute, and it appears now to be a question
of harmonizing their proposals in order to arrive at a text acceptable
to States.10
15. To assist the Preparatory Committee in its work, members of
the Committee will consolidate the governmental proposals annexed to
the August Preparatory Committee Session Report and produce a har-
monized text. This harmonized text will include the specific elements
of the four core crimes to be included in the Statute and a part on gen-
eral principles of criminal law. These Committee members will con-
sider, among other things, general principles accepted by the major le-
gal systems of the world, as well as principles of legality, vagueness,
and overbreadth. Substantive crimes will be defined according to
treaty language, case law, the definitions used by those learned in the
law, and general interpretations of similar crimes found in the domes-
tic systems around the world.
16. For the same reasons, some members of the Committee feel
that, insofar as practical, treaty crimes should be defined in the
Court's Statute rather than simply incorporated by reference.'
8. Edward M. Wise, Report on General Rules of Criminal Law, 25 DENV. J. INTL L.
& POLY 318 (1997)
9. Id.
10. One member of the Committee disagrees. In his view, international law should
be the starting point for defining international crimes, and harmonization of national
proposals is thus inappropriate.
11. As one member noted, if the treaty language is vague, to the extent that the
treaty does not have "real" definitions in it, then referring to the treaty is little help in
determining an element of a particular treaty crime. On the other hand, it must be clear
that the definition in the Court's statute does not substitute its language for what is
contained in the treaty.
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17. Aggression: As noted in paragraph 10, most members of the
Committee urge both the inclusion of this crime and its definition in
the Court's Statute. In particular, these members of the Committee
support the inclusion of jurisdiction over acts of aggression, not just
wars of aggression. Although the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) judgment at Nuremberg specifically condemned only aggressive
war, international law has since evolved and international condemna-
tion of aggressive acts is now part of customary international law and
should be included as such.
18. Crimes Against Humanity: Discussions at the Preparatory
Committee meetings apparently now evidence a preference for the
Statute's definition of Crime Against Humanity to parallel the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) definition rather than the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defi-
nition of this crime by including the words "widespread or systematic"
as an element of the crime. 2 This is desired by States as a fiter that
would implement the principle of complementarity by permitting the
International Criminal Court to assume jurisdiction only in cases of
widespread or systematic abuses. Certainly, if such language is to be
added to the definition of the crime, States should be willing to elimi-
nate the regime of State consent currently envisaged by the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute, and replace it with a regime of inherent jurisdiction
(not subject to State consent), such as is now envisaged for genocide.
19. Although the Committee understands that murder does not, as
a general rule, rise to the level of an international crime, and that
some means must be adopted to distinguish crimes against humanity
from ordinary crimes, the proposed solution is unfortunate in that it
collapses the jurisdictional trigger and actus reus into one. One mem-
ber suggested that rather than including this language in the defini-
tion of the crime, the jurisdictional trigger be contained either in the
article on admissibility (currently Article 35, which provides the Court
may dismiss cases that are "not of such gravity to justify further ac-
tion by the Court") or in a non-definitional section of the Statute re-
garding crimes against humanity. Then, it will not be thought of as a
limitation on the nature of the crime, but on the Court's jurisdiction.
20. Finally, there is general agreement that the crime should be
defined with reference to specific acts,' 3 and that no nexus to armed
conflict should be required. Although there was some inclination to de-
viate from the arguably redundant language found in most modern for-
mulations of the crime (i.e., murder, extermination, etc .... ) it was
ultimately agreed that traditional formulations should be retained,
even if redundant, to avoid lengthy and fruitless discussions that
might result from an attempt to change them.
12. This phrase is not part of the customary definition. See infra text para. 19.
13. But see also, supra note 7.
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21. Genocide: In spite of the objections one might make concerning
the definition of Genocide in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention,
most notably, the lack of protection for political groups, the Committee
believes that the definition of genocide in the International Criminal
Court Statute should track Article 2 of the Convention. The current
definition already has the status of customary international law, has
been agreed to by a significant majority of the world's nations and,
thus, has the virtue of being practically universally accepted. One is-
sue that needs to be addressed, however, is the question of intent. It
was suggested that the mental state that would subject an upper level
policy-maker to responsibility for genocide differs from the standard to
be applied to individuals lower down on the chain of command, such as
a camp guard. Others, however, consider that genocide as such (with
the same general mens rea standard for each type of actor, tested cir-
cumstantially) can be different than dereliction of duty concerning
"policy-maker . . . responsibility" for acts of genocide engaged in by
others over whom one has authority or command.
22. War Crimes: In the 1994 ILC Draft, an attempt was made to
separate war crimes from the grave breaches system of the Geneva
Conventions and to adopt a new definition of "serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in armed conflict."' 4 Discussions during
the Preparatory Committee, while not yet conclusive, evidence a differ-
ent trend, which would, like the ICTY Statute, retain a two-tier cate-
gory for war crimes. Grave breaches and Protocol I would be retained
as a separate category, and would be within the Court's inherent juris-
diction. Other "violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict," and, in particular, violations of common Article 3 and Proto-
col II, however, would be prosecutable only if a consistent state policy
and practice could be established. Otherwise, consistent with the prin-
ciple of complementarity, jurisdiction would shift to national criminal
justice systems, unless national courts were unwilling or unable to act
fairly and effectively. 5 Although understanding the rationale for this
proposal, the Committee cannot endorse it. Indeed, several members
expressed deep concern about this issue.
23. First, although it is commendable that the Statute, as con-
ceived, would grant the Court inherent jurisdiction over grave
breaches, the limitations sought to be placed on all other serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war are problematic. Proving a state
policy to commit war crimes will be difficult and may raise insur-
mountable obstacles to international prosecution. If, for example, the
Prosecutor is asked to investigate a situation by the Security Council,
how will he or she conduct this kind of investigation? Presumably the
Prosecutor will have the burden of proof, but the evidence will lie in
14. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(c).
15. It would be inappropriate to require State policy or practice addressing war
crimes committed by insurgents or other non-state actors.
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the hands of the highest State officials. Suppose that the State officials
say that there is no such policy and that they are therefore pursuing
the investigation. May the Prosecutor, at that point, allege that the
national legal system is not "fair and effective" to recover jurisdiction
over the offenses? A "minitrial" may thus be required at a very prelim-
inary stage merely to establish the Court's jurisdiction. At the very
least, if this kind of definition is to be incorporated into the Statute's
provision on war crimes, it must be made clear that it is not an aspect
of the crime's definition, but the Court's jurisdiction.
24. Second, the Committee feels that the Court should have juris-
diction over "war crimes" whether they are committed in international
or non-international armed conflict and by state or non-state actors.
Consistent with its views on other matters, it also feels that the
crimes to be covered should be enumerated in the Statute. 16
25. Treaty Crimes: As with the four core crimes to be included in
the Statute, the Committee generally feels that, to the extent practica-
ble, treaty crimes should be defined in the Court's Statute, not merely
incorporated by reference.
26. At the same time, the Committee also feels crimes defined in
new treaties should be able to come within the Court's jurisdiction
without the need for convening a diplomatic conference each time. Pre-
sumably, this would be accomplished by having the Treaty itself refer
to the Court, and have the Conference of States Parties 17 accept the
extension of the Court's jurisdiction over the new crimes. This would
also apply to amendments to treaties. The Committee recommends
that a procedure for this be adopted from the outset.
III. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
27. The Statute of the Court should set out general principles of
evidence, rules of procedure and rights of the accused, including the
due process and the principles contained in Articles 9, 10, and 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Human
rights to due process provide a minimum set of guarantees that must
be respected by the Court. At the same time, however, these provisions
need not be detailed. Rather, they should be limited in the Court's
Statute to the setting out of general principles common to the civil law
16. In this regard, special mention was made of rape which is referred to in some of
the proposals made by governments to define war crimes. The Committee agrees that
rape should be specifically enumerated as a crime in the Statute. A specific conviction
for rape, as opposed to "inflicting bodily injury" or some other vague formulation may
have more deterrent effect, or, at least, serve to increase the stigma attached to the
crime.
17. The proposed Conference of States Parties is discussed in Thomas Warrick, Ad-
ministrative and Financial Issues of the International Criminal Court, 25 DENv. J. IN'L
L. & POLy' 376-77 (1997).
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and common law systems."' Detailed rules will be elaborated by the
Court (the Judiciary) and submitted to the Conference of States Par-
ties for approval.
28. The Statute, as currently drafted, does not indicate whether
the criminal trial procedure to be followed is to be more akin to a com-
mon law or civil law trial. As one member noted, depending on which
one is chosen, more will follow. Ultimately, the Committee feels that
rules will evolve from a mixed system. Merging aspects of both sys-
tems will need to be established by the Court on an ongoing basis,
with their decisions being guided by the general principles set out in
the Statute.
IV. TRIGGERING MECHANISM, STATE CONSENT, AND COMPLEMENTARITY
29. Who may initiate prosecution? The Committee supports the
general scheme proposed by the ILC to the effect that a State party to
the Statute and the Security Council may refer matters to the Court.19
There is also some support among the Committee's membership for
permitting the prosecutor to act on his or her own initiative and for
permitting the General Assembly to refer matters to the Court. Treaty
crimes, unlike the other four "core" crimes, will be referable only
where a Treaty applies 20 and the relevant States21 consent to the
Court's jurisdiction.
18. To assist the Preparatory Committee in its work, Fellows of the International
Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University will consolidate the proposals on
rules of procedure and evidence found in Volume II of the Preparatory Committee Re-
port on the Second Session and distill from them general principles common to both the
civil and common law systems.
19. For a discussion of whether a Security Council referral is pursuant to Chapter
VI or VII, see infra text para. 30.
20. Because genocide is in one sense a Treaty crime, the question arises whether
the Court would receive complaints from States that are parties to the Genocide Conven-
tion but not the Court's Statute. The ILC opted not to permit this in Article 25(1) of the
draft statute, noting that on balance,
this may encourage States to accept the rights and obligations provided for
in the Statute and to share in the financial burden relating to the operating
costs of the Court. Moreover in practice the Court could only satisfactorily
deal with a prosecution initiated by complaint if the complainant is cooper-
ating with the Court under Part 7 of the Statute in relation to such matters
as the provision of evidence, witnesses, etc.
1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Comment, at 89.
21. The ILC Draft is not completely clear on this, but under the current state con-
sent regime, set out in Article 21, the State having custody of the accused, (the "custo-
dial state"), the territorial state (where the act occurred), and any state having filed an
extradition request with the custodial state (unless that request is rejected) must con-
sent to the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case. In addition, the treaty must apply to
the conduct under investigation, meaning that the country of which the accused is a na-
tional or upon whose territory the crime was committed, is a party. See Article 39(b) and
comments thereto. Presumably, even if the consent regime drops out for the four core
crimes, some version of this consent regime will necessarily remain as regards to treaty
crimes.
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30. The Security Council: The Relationship of the Court to the Se-
curity Council is particularly problematic. Although, as noted in para-
graph 29, the Committee generally believes that the Security Council
should be permitted to refer matters to the Court. The Committee ob-
jects to proposed Article 23(3) which permits the Security Council to
block prosecutions if it is dealing with a matter under Chapter VII.
Preferably, the provision should be deleted. If retained, it should be
redrafted.2 2
31. Essentially, the Committee feels that the Court should be in-
dependent from the Security Council. In addition, Article 23(3) in-
troduces a substantial inequality between States which are members
of the Security Council and other states, as the Committee noted in its
comments to Article 23(3).2
32. Finally, it was pointed out that the Statute is not clear as to
whether the Security Council would be in any way required to use
Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI in order to require the Security
Council to enforce the jurisdiction of the Court. Indeed, it may be that
the Security Council wishes to preserve this ambiguity in order to re-
tain flexibility as well as political leverage in a particular situation.
33. State Consent and Inherent Jurisdiction: The Committee
strongly opposes the regime of State consent now contained in the ILC
draft. It is likely to be complicated and cumbersome at best, and to
cripple the proposed Court at worst, at least in cases in which the
matter has not been referred by the Security Council under Chapter
VII (in which case, the Security Council will presumably use its en-
forcement powers in aid of the Court's jurisdiction). Instead, States
that adhere to the Court's Statute should be deemed to have accepted
the Court's jurisdiction in all cases except Treaty Crimes, subject, of
course, to the limits of complementarity and other jurisdictional
preconditions.
34. The Preparatory Committee discussions have apparently
veered away from the ILC proposal to a system of essentially inherent
jurisdiction over all crimes, except aggression which would be subject
to a preliminary Security Council determination (see supra paragraph
10) and war crimes that are not grave breaches. This is a step in the
22. Should some version of Article 23(3) be retained, one Committee member sug-
gested the following language might render the Security Council more accountable than
the present text: "Whenever the Council makes a formal determination that the Court's
activity interferes with the Security Council's activities to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security it may request the Court to suspend its activities."
23. It also introduces inequalities between States that are permanent members of
the Council and other States, and may thus discourage adherence to the Court's statute
by some states. The Comments to the 1994 ILC Draft suggest instead a savings clause
in the Treaty to the effect that "Nothing in [this Statute] shall be interpreted as in any
way affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and
powers of the organs of the United Nations." 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Com-
ments to art. 23(3).
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right direction, provided that, as discussed above, the definitions of the
crimes that are substituted for the regime of State consent neither
complicate nor narrow the Court's jurisdiction. In particular, serious
violations of common Article 3 and Protocol II should be within the
Court's inherent jurisdiction.
35. Complementarity: This still does not resolve the issue of com-
plementarity. It is self-evident that a relationship between State par-
ties and the ICC must be established and that a mechanism must be
put in place in order to distribute jurisdiction in particular cases be-
tween national tribunals and the Criminal Court.24 This might be a
unitary system in which either the international criminal court or na-
tional courts would always have primacy, or it might be a case-by-case
system that would link jurisdiction to particular factual situations de-
pending on the crimes charged. The ILC opted for a system in which
the Court would assert jurisdiction only where domestic jurisdictions
are either unavailable or ineffective. 25 Pursuant to Article 35 of the
Statute, any "interested State" may challenge the admissibility of a
case prior to the commencement of the trial, if a State (which has or
may have jurisdiction) is itself investigating a crime, or has investi-
gated a crime and, upon a decision apparently well-founded, concluded
that it will not proceed to prosecution.
36. The Committee generally agrees that the Statute should favor
domestic prosecutions, where available and effective.
To the extent that an ICC prosecution would merely duplicate the
efforts of a State (or would only marginally improve the likelihood
of successful prosecution), the expense, effort and possible offense
to a sovereigns judicial system, is probably not justified. In addi-
tion, given that State systems are generally better developed at
this point . .. the concept of the ICC as a supplemental court, at
24. As the Special Rapporteur noted:
[Clomplementarity questions . . . arise ... in cases where both the Court
and a State have not only the capacity, but the intent to prosecute the same
crime. [C]omplementarity presupposes that there is a subset of "interested
states" with an interest in prosecuting these cases.... To resolve whether
[an interested State] ... may claim precedence over the prosecution of an
international crime, the ILC Draft must address five issues:
(1)What factors define an "interested state" for purposes of challenging ICC
jurisdiction;
(2)As between two competent forums, the ICC and the domestic court of an
interested state, which forum has priority;
(3)What standard shall apply for determining the competency of a domestic
forum;
(4)Who has the burden of proof in determining whether a domestic forum is
competent;
(5)What institution will ultimately resolve whether a domestic forum is
competent and at what stage of the proceedings.
Jeff Bleich, Complementarity, 25 DENv. J. INTL L. & PoL'l281-82 (1997).
25. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 6, Preamble, text 3.
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least in theory, seems proper.26
However, the Committee strongly feels that it should be the Court, not
States, that determines whether a case is admissible.27 Notwithstand-
ing, it may be that Article 35 requires an amendment in order to more
clearly specify the situations in which the Court should find a case
inadmissible.
28
37. The Committee is aware of States' fears that the Court will be-
come a supranational entity and the various efforts made in the ILC
Draft to assuage this concern, including the regime of State consent
and the principle of complementarity which is understandable in this
regard. While at least some members of the Committee believe that
this supranationalism is inevitable (and, indeed a positive aspect of
the Court), the Committee, as a whole, understands the legitimate con-
cern States may have in preserving the integrity of their criminal jus-
tice systems, and indeed, their sovereignty as a whole. Nevertheless,
particularly as regards issues such as arrest and transfer, as well as
the collection of evidence, if requests from the Court were to be treated
as if they were merely requests from any other State, this would pose,
potentially, insurmountable problems for the Court's functioning. Evi-
dence could disappear, suspects could vanish - indeed, the very ad-
vantage that stems from having a permanent Court as opposed to an
ad hoc tribunal would largely evaporate. Thus, the Committee recom-
mends that requests from the Court, particularly as regards arrest and
transfer of the accused and the collection of evidence, should be on a
"fast track," treated not like any other State request, but specially and
quickly implemented. Indeed, States should be required to implement
such legislation as a condition of adhering to the Court's statute.
V. CONCLUSION
38. The Committee is confident in the view that none of the legal
issues raised by the Court's creation are intractable in nature. Consis-
tent with its charge, the Committee's report addresses key elements of
the proposed Court's Statute as opposed to undertaking an article by
article analysis of the 1994 ILC Draft. Subsequent reports will address
issues not commented upon here. The Committee hopes its work will
prove useful to the members of the Preparatory Committee in their de-
liberations and urges them to consider this report and the reports an-
nexed thereto in their discussions over the next year.
26. Bleich, supra note 24, at 289-90.
27. Similarly, the Committee feels that a State challenging the jurisdiction of the
Court (Art. 34) or the admissibility of a case (Art. 35) should bear the burden of estab-
lishing that a case is not admissible. See Bleich, supra note 24, at 291.
28. In addition, the difference between "jurisdiction" and "admissibility" is not al-
ways clear. It would be preferable if the Statute either employed a unitary concept or ex-
plicitly defined the relationship between these two ideas.
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